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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THESTATKOFU I AH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
DENNIS ROSA-RE,

:

Defendant/Petitioner.

Case No. 20070305-SC
Case No. 20060432-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This I 'otnl gntnled Dennis Rosa-Re's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah
Court of Appeals in State v. Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91, 2007 WL 772769 (attached as
Addendum A). The Court's Order granting the Petition is attached as Addendum B.
Jurisdiction is eonfiTp1'! on Ibis Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(5) and 782a-4(2002).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REV TEW
Statement of the Issue: " Whether Petitioner's Batson challenge was timely." See
Addendum B, hereto.
Standard of Review:
On certiorari, "we review the decision of the court of appeals, and not that of the
district court." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, Tf25, 63 P.3d 650 (citation omitted).
Whether [petitioner's] Batson challenge was timely raised is a question of law.
We review questions of law for correctness, granting no deference to the legal
conclusions of the court of appeals. Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt, 2004 UT
1 2 4 9, 84P.3d1?01.
State v. Valdez* 2006 UT 39, | 1 1 , 140 P.3d 1219.

PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
At trial, Petitioner Rosa-Re challenged the state's use of peremptory strikes
pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), before the trial court empaneled a
jury and dismissed the remainder of the venire. The timely Batson challenge is contained
in the record on appeal at 146:38-43 and 164 (attached as Addendum C). Also, the court
of appeals addressed the timeliness issue in an unpublished Memorandum Decision,
dated March 15, 2007. See Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91 (attached as Addendum A).
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is relevant to the
issue on review. It is attached as Addendum D.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below
On April 1, 2005, the state filed an information against Rosa-Re for forcible
sexual abuse, a second degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (2003),
and child abuse, a class A misdemeanor offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109
(2003). (R. 1-3). In March 2006, the trial court presided over a jury trial in the matter.
(R. 146). At the conclusion, the jury rendered a guilty verdict on the felony offense and
an acquittal on the misdemeanor offense. (R. 114).
On May 8, 2006, the trial court sentenced Rosa-Re to a term of one to fifteen years
at the Utah State Prison. (R. 131-32). Rosa-Re appealed. (R. 133). He raised an issue
under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), claiming that the prosecutor engaged in
discrimination when he used peremptory strikes to remove three men, who presumptively
2

would sit on the jury. See. Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91 (stating defendant's argument "is
that the State improperly exercised its peremptory challenges to remove males from the
jury in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution").
On March 15, 2007, the court of appeals ruled. It stated that Rosa-Re failed to
"resolve his" Batson challenge in a timely manner in the trial court, and it refused to
address Rosa-Re's Bats on issue on the merits. Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91. Rosa-Re
petitioned for review in this Court. This Court granted the petition. (See Addendum B).
STATEMENT OF FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The state presented the following evidence at trial in this case. Edgardo Rameriz
and Lidea Bolanos lived in Kearns on Silvertip Drive with Lidea's sons Moses and then
15-year-old Joshua. (See R. 146:99, 101-02 (stating Lidea also had a son, Christian);
146:133). Joshua wore hearing aids. (R. 146:85). Edgardo was in the
transportation/trucking business. (R. 146:100, 109, 133).
On March 28, 2005, Edgardo arranged for Rosa-Re and a second man, Neftole, to
spend the night at his house. (R. 146:54-55,58-59,115,135-140). The men were
planning to leave town early the next morning. (See R. 146:117).
Neftole slept in a spare room downstairs next to Joshua's room. (R. 146:60).
Rosa-Re "was supposed to sleep" there too. (R. 146:57). According to Joshua, when he
showed the spare room to Rosa-Re, he said "no, he said he didn't want to, he wanted to
sleep in my bedroom. He was going to sleep on half of the bed." (R. 146:60). Joshua had
a queen-sized bed. (R. 146:60). Joshua slept on the left side of the bed, and Rosa-Re
slept on the right side. (R. 146:61).

3

Joshua testified, "I was sleeping and, you know, dreaming, I don't remember what
I dreamt about. Then I felt someone grab my body and then I didn't feel it." (R. 146:61).
He also explained, fl[it] felt like someone was going down my leg and grabbed my dick
and my balls and then the other hand came in down this way and touched it hard." (R.
146:63). Joshua testified that Rosa-Re turned him onto his back spread open his legs and
was touching his "dick" and "balls" under his shorts and "skin-to-skin." (R. 146:61-63,
91-92). According to Joshua, Rosa-Re grabbed and pulled his genitals hard until they
hurt. (R. 146:61-62, 63, 66). Joshua tried to get up twice, but Rosa-Re forced him down
by pressing hard on his chest. (R. 146:64, 77, 92). According to Joshua, Rosa-Re told
him not to tell anyone or he would kill him or his parents. (R. 146:62, 64, 92).
Joshua testified that he "kind of choked up" and "watched the wall." (R. 146:64,
78). When he was able, he broke away, grabbed his hearing aids from the nightstand and
ran upstairs (R. 146:92), to his brother's room. (R. 146:64-65, 78).
Rosa-Re went to Edgardo and Lidea's bedroom, and knocked on the door to wake
Edgardo. (R. 146:65, 105). He told Edgardo it was time to leave. (R. 146:65, 105).
After the men left, Joshua told his mother what happened and called the police.
(R. 146:65,66,79). The police ultimately arrested Rosa-Re. (SeeR. 146:123-24, 126,
149). Joshua went to a doctor (R. 146:66, 108), and saw that his genitals were red. (R.
146:67). Also, he had a hand mark on his chest. (R. 146:67, 107).
At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Rosa-Re of forcible sexual abuse, and
acquitted him of child abuse. (R. 146:211). On May 8, 2006, the trial court sentenced
Rosa-Re to a term of one to fifteen years in prison. (R. 147:8-9). He is incarcerated.

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Utah law, a defendant making a Batson challenge at trial must raise
the issue before the jury is sworn and before the remainder of the venire is excused. In
this case, Petitioner Rosa-Re raised a Batson challenge immediately after the parties
exercised peremptory strikes and before the trial court announced the jury panel and
excused the remainder of the venire. Notwithstanding, the trial court delayed in resolving
the Batson challenge until after it had empaneled a jury and excused the remaining venire
members. The trial court delay was to the detriment of Rosa-Re. Indeed, the court of
appeals refused to address the Batson issue on the merits, and instead ruled that RosaRe's challenge was untimely because "trial counsel failed to conclude a Batson challenge
prior to the empaneling of the jury." Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91.
The court of appeals' ruling is in error. Rosa-Re raised a timely Batson challenge.
Since the trial court failed to resolve the challenge until later, that constitutes trial court
error. Rosa-Re respectfully requests that this Court reverse the court of appeals' ruling
with regard to the timeliness of the Batson challenge.
ARGUMENT
ROSA-RE MADE A TIMELY CHALLENGE UNDER BATSON V.
KENTUCKY, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), IN A SIDEBAR CONFERENCE DURING
JURY SELECTION, BEFORE THE JURY WAS SWORN AND THE
REMAINDER OF THE VENIRE WAS EXCUSED. THE TRIAL COURT,
HOWEVER, WAITED TO RESOLVE THE MATTER UNTIL LATER.
A. BATSON PROTECTS AGAINST GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION IN
JURY SELECTION ON THE BASIS OF RACE OR GENDER. IF A PARTY
MAKES A BATSON CHALLENGE AND OBJECTS TO THE GOVERNMENT'S USE OF PEREMPTORY STRIKES IN JURY SELECTION, THE
TRIAL COURT WILL APPLY A THREE-PART TEST TO THE MATTER.
5

During jury selection, a party may exercise peremptory strikes for "any reason, or
for no reason at all." State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, ^[6, 41 P.3d 1153. However, it is
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution for a party to strike
prospective jury members from the venire based on race or gender. See, e.g., J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994); see also State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App'305, f28,
989 P.2d 503; Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-3 (2002); U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
According to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and its progeny, the Equal
Protection Clause protects criminal defendants, prospective jurors, and society against
government-sponsored discrimination in the jury selection process. "When persons are
excluded from participation in our democratic processes solely because of race or gender,
[the] promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial system is jeopardized."
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 146; see also Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f 17 (stating litigants are entitled to
jury selection using nondiscriminatory methods; jurors are entitled to nondiscriminatory
procedures; and the "community has an interest in fair jury selection procedures").
To determine whether a peremptory strike violates equal protection under Batson,
Utah courts apply a three-part test. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f 15 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at
93-97). This test applies in cases of gender discrimination.
The first part of the test considers whether "the opponent" of the peremptory strike
- i.e., the defense - has established "a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in
the selection of the petit jury." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, |15 (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S.
765, 767 (1995); State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8,ffl[17-18,994 P.2d 177). That is, the
defense must show that the prosecutor engaged in racial or gender discrimination in
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striking potential jurors from the venire. See e.g.. Bats on, 476 U.S. at 96-97 (holding that
a pattern of striking members of a cognizable group may give rise to an inference of
discrimination).
This first part of the test is met in cases where the prosecutor has not specifically
contested "the sufficiency of the [defendants] prima facie case" for discrimination. State
v. Hizzinbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1996); see Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ^[18. In that
instance, the defendants prima facie case may be deemed sufficient, and any claim by the
prosecution to the contrary is waived for purposes of appeal. See. Colwell, 2000 UT 8,
\ 18. The analysis then continues to the second part of the test.
Under the second part, "once the opponent [i.e., the defense] has established a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the proponent of the peremptory challenges [i.e., the
prosecutor] to rebut the prima facie case by offering neutral, nondiscriminatory
justifications for the peremptory challenges." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f 15 (citing Batson,
476 U.S. at 97; Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005); Colwell, 2000 UT 8,1J19).
A proponent cannot meet this burden by simply denying a discriminatory motive
or professing good faith. Batson. 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Rather, a
proponent must proffer justifications that are: (1) neutral; (2) related to the
particular case to be tried; (3) reasonably specific and clear; and (4) legitimate.
See id. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ("[T]he prosecutor must give a 'clear and
reasonably specific5 explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the
challenges." (quoting Texas Dep't ofCmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258,
101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981))); State v. Hizzinbotham, 917 P.2d 545,
548 (Utah 1996) (listing the four factors discussed above) (citations omitted).
Valdez, 2006 UT 39,^15.
Under the third part of the test, if the prosecutor "provides a sufficient explanation
for the peremptory challenges," the trial court must decide whether the defense "has
7

proven purposeful discrimination." Id. at ^15 (footnote and cites omitted). In short,
under the three-part test, the party raising the Batson challenge must articulate a prima
facie case for discrimination; the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to give neutral
reasons for his actions; finally, the trial court must decide the matter. See kL
In this case, the three-part test is relevant to the timeliness issue where Petitioner
Rosa-Re properly raised an objection under Batson and specified that the challenge
concerned gender discrimination. (See R. 164:38). However, the trial court did not
proceed with the analysis and then final resolution until later. (See R. 146:38-42). Given
the fact that the analysis recognizes a burden shifting and requires the trial court to decide
the matter, the court of appeals erred when it ruled that Rosa-Re's objection was
untimely. See Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91. Indeed, Rosa-Re was the only party to take
action in a timely manner in this case.
B. ONCE A BATSON CHALLENGE IS RAISED, THE TRIAL COURT MUST
RESOLVE IT.
1. A Defendant Must Raise an Objection Under Batson Before the Jury Is Sworn
and the Remainder of the Venire is Excused.
In considering the timeliness of a Batson challenge, this Court recently ruled:
[A] Batson challenge is only timely if raised both before the jury is sworn and
before the remainder of the venire is excused. Under firmly established Utah law,
a Batson challenge is only timely if it is raised before the jury is sworn. We take
the opportunity provided by this case to clarify that a Batson objection must also
be raised before the venire is dismissed.
Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f2; see also id atffl[26,42-43, 46. In Vqldez, counsel waited until
after a jury had been empaneled, the remainder of the venire had been excused, and the
jury had been sworn, instructed, and dismissed for lunch to raise a Batson challenge for
8

the first time. M a t f 4 . This Court considered that to be untimely. Id. a t f ! 2 .
It articulated the importance of timeliness in conjunction with the three-part test.
It stated the Batson procedure would be severely impeded if a challenge were to be raised
"after the jury selection process is complete. The burden-shifting framework of Batson is
best implemented if it is litigated while the peremptory strikes are fresh in the minds of
both the court and the litigants." IcL_ at ^[42. That is, the party making the challenge will be
better equipped if he raises the issue "sooner rather than later." M at ^43 (note omitted).
Also, the Court specified that timely raised objections allow for an efficient and
effective process, appropriate remedies, and little disruption in the proceedings. See id_ at
1fi[43, 44. Moreover, timely objections prevent "sandbagging," which may occur if the
party making the challenge waits until after an unsuccessful trial to raise the issue. Id, at
^[44; see also Ford v. Georgia. 498 U.S. 411, 422 (1991) (stating that the requirement
that a Batson claim be raised "in the period between the selection of the jurors and the
administration of their oaths, is a sensible rule"); Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319, 325-28 (4th
Cir. 2004) (recognizing that at trial defendant twice indicated there were no problems
with the jury even after repeated inquires by the trial court; thus, defendants Batson
challenge raised "two years later" on appeal was not adequately preserved), cert, denied,
543 U.S. 919 (2004); McCrory v. Henderson, 82 F.3d 1243, 1247 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating
that a Batson objection raised after the trial has begun would require aborting the trial;
also such an objection would permit manipulation of the system to the prejudice of the
prosecution and it would induce defendants to delay in raising the objection); U.S. v.
Dobvnes, 905 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (8th Cir. 1990 ) (holding that a Batson challenge raised
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for the first time after trial was untimely in part because the only remedy after trial would
be to vacate the conviction), cert denied, 498 U.S. 877 (1990); US. v. Forbes, 816 F.2d
1006, 1011 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating the timely objection rule prevents defendants from
sandbagging); State v. Heiskell 896 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing
that defense counsel waited until "jeopardy had attached" with the statefs first witness
before making a Batson claim; thus, the issue was not timely preserved).
The timely objection rule articulated in Valdez is consistent with the purposes
served by Utah's preservation rule. In State v. Holzate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346, this
Court stated that the preservation rule serves two important policies.
First, "in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." Second, a
defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy
of "enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,
... claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse."
Id. at fl 1 (internal citations omitted).
When a defendant with a Batson challenge makes an objection before the jury is
sworn and the remainder of the venire is excused, the first policy consideration set forth
in Holgate is satisfied. A timely objection "direct[s] the attention of the court to the
claimed errors" so that the court "might have an opportunity to correct them." Tolman v.
Winchester Hills Co., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (cites omitted) (discussing
the rule for preservation in general); see also Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^|43 (recognizing that a
timely objection allows the trial court to determine the Batson issue).
Also, in that instance, the defendant is not seeking to circumvent the process or to
sandbag anyone. Indeed, he has not delayed in making his objection for any reason.
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Thus, the second policy consideration set forth in Holzate is satisfied: the defendant has
not delayed in "making an objection with the strategy of 'enhancing his] chances of
acquittal and then, if that strategy fails," claiming error on appeal. See Holgate, 2000 UT
74, Tfl 1 (citation omitted). Once a defendant has timely raised his objection, it is up to
the trial court to resolve it.
2. The Trial Court Must Resolve a Timely Objection.
After a defendant has raised a Batson challenge to a prosecutors peremptory
strikes, the trial court must continue with the analysis under the burden-shifting framework of Batson. See, e.g., Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f 15. In the face of a Batson challenge,
"it is the duty of the trial court to apply the analytical framework set forth by the Supreme
Court in Batson and its progeny, together with any elucidations thereof adopted by this
Court, before the venireperson [who is the subject of the challenge] is removed from the
panel." Parham v. Horace Mann Ins. Co.. 490 S.E.2d 696, 703 (W.Va. 1997).
As stated above, the analytical framework includes the presentation of a prima
facie case and a burden-shifting, where the proponent of the peremptory strikes is
required to offer neutral, nondiscriminatory justifications for his actions. Valdez, 2006
UT 39, ^[15; (supra. Argument A., herein). The proponent of the peremptory strikes is
more capable of offering justifications for his actions while the voir dire and the reasons
for the strikes are "fresh in his mind." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, | 4 3 .
Thereafter, under the Batson process, see icL at 115 (stating that under the third
step, the trial court must determine whether there was discrimination injury selection),
the trial court must be prepared to fashion a proper remedy if discrimination is found.
11

See id. at^43.
The Batson framework is designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and
inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process. In
order to ensure that this framework produces actual answers, it is necessary that
Batson challenges are promptly raised and that courts timely rule upon them. The
rule we set forth, which requires that a Batson challenge be raised both before the
jury is sworn and before the venire is dismissed, efficiently allows the trial court
to determine the issues the Batson test is designed to resolve.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added).
Indeed, a trial court may not postpone the Batson process until later, since such an
approach would prevent the court from taking proper corrective action in the face of
prosecutorial discrimination. See, e.g.. State v. Robinson, 676 A.2d 384, 391-92 (Conn.
1996) (ruling that a defendant must voice an objection under Batson before the jury is
sworn, and the trial court must promptly resolve it; where the trial court failed to hold a
proper Batson hearing, the remedy is a new trial).
[For the trial court to postpone] consideration of a Batson claim until the trial is in
progress, or even completed, as in this case, risks infecting what would have been
the prosecutor's spontaneous explanations with contrived rationalizations, and may
create a subtle pressure for even the most conscientious district judge to accept
explanations of borderline plausibility to avoid the only relief then available, a
new trial. Cf. United States v. Tunnessen, 763 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1985)
(requiring contemporaneous statement of "ends of justice" continuance under 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1988) to guard against risk that district judge "may
simply rationalize his action long after the fact").
U.S. v. Biaeei, 909 F.2d 662, 679 (2d Cir. 1990), cert, denied. 499 U.S. 904 (1991); see
also id^ (stating "Batson objections should be entertained and adjudicated during the
process of jury selection1'; the district court's preference for written motions "must give
way to the need to resolve a Batson claim at the point where prompt corrective action can
be taken if the claim is successful").
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[A] delay in requiring a striking party to articulate its reasons for exercising a
peremptory strike until after the trial is completed fails to vindicate the rights of
any venireperson wrongfully excluded from sitting on a jury. See Missouri v.
Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (stating that even when the
panel is quashed and the jury selection process begins anew, it "does not really
correct the error.... [T]he discrimination endured by the excluded venirepersons
goes completely unredressed since they remain wrongfully excluded from jury
service."). On the other hand, an immediate resolution of a Batson challenge will
provide the trial court with the opportunity to disallow a discriminatory
peremptory strike, protecting the equal protection rights of the venireperson along
with the equal protection rights of the non-striking party. This approach promotes
judicial economy by addressing meritorious claims without the necessity of
awarding a new trial. See ici This approach also permits the striking party to
articulate its reason for exercising the peremptory strike while the facts are fresh in
the minds of all the participants, and it reduces the appearance that the striking
party had time to fabricate its reason for using the strike. See id. at 938.
Parham v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 490 S.E.2d 696, 703 (W.Va. 1997). Timely resolution
of a Batson challenge is critical to the process.
In this case, Rosa-Re timely raised a Batson challenge. However, the trial court
waited to resolve the matter until later. That was error.
C. THE OBJECTION IN THIS CASE COMPLIED WITH VALDEZ AND WITH
UTAH LAW CONCERNING PRESERVATION.
In this case, the defense raised a Batson challenge before the trial court empaneled
a jury, before the jury was sworn, and before the remainder of the venire was excused.
(See R. 146:38, line 15 (reflecting sidebar); 164:38). Specifically, on March 14, 2006,
the trial began with jury selection. (See R. 146:2). After the trial court and attorneys
conducted voir dire and dealt with challenges for cause (see R. 146:2-33; see also 78-79
(reflecting venire members who were stricken for cause)), the trial court gave the
attorneys the opportunity to exercise peremptory strikes. (See R. 146:33; see also 78-79).
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At that point in the process, the list of 16 potential jurors included the following:
[2]
[5]
[7]
[11
[14
[15
[16
[17
[18
[19
[20
[21
[23
[24
[25
[28

Boyd Tidwell
Dorothy Vlamakis
Janet Anderson
Tamera Sollis
Jed Worley
Darrell Jensen
Judy Dearden
Connie Iverson
Paul Braun
Jonathan Peay
Janae Beausheur
Jeffrey Mace
June Christenson
Teri Pearce-Rich
Angela Avila
Carl Stechschulte.

(R. 78-79) (emphasis added).
Immediately after the parties had exercised their peremptory strikes, the defense
requested a sidebar conference. (See R. 146:38). The sidebar conference was transcribed
and is contained in the record on appeal. (See R. 164). The relevant portions of the
record are attached hereto as Addendum C.
During the sidebar conference, defense counsel advised the trial court that given
the seriousness of the sexual assault charges, ffwefre probably going to need the record to
make a Batson challenge." (R. 164:38). Counsel specified that of the sixteen remaining
venire members, the prosecutor struck the top three men (id.), who presumptively would
sit on the jury. (Id.) The men were [2] Body Tidwell, [14] Jed Worley, and [15] Darrel
Jensen. (See R. 78). The prosecutor asked defense counsel to repeat his objection. (R.
164:38). Defense counsel did. He stated, M[w]e had four potential male jurors and you
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struck three." (Id.) He also specified that he needed the record for the challenge. (Id.)
The prosecutor then explained that striking the men "wasn't intentional on my
part." (Id); but see Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^[15 (stating it is not enough for the prosecutor
to simply deny a discriminatory motive or to profess good faith). Defense counsel again
stated that the parties needed the record for the analysis (R. 164:38 (stating "we just need
to make a record and go through the . . .")), when the trial court interrupted to say, "Okay,
alright, we can do that." (Id.)
However, rather than "do that," the trial court proceeded to empanel a jury. (See
R. 146:38-39). The trial judge read off the names of the seven-women, one-man jury
panel and he asked defense counsel, "Mr. Misner and Ms. Chestnut [sic], is this the jury
that you selected." (Id.) Defense counsel answered, "Yes, Your Honor, thank you." (Id.)
Defense counsel's response was appropriate: the defense did not have an objection
to those individuals. Rather, defendant had made an objection under Batson (R. 164:38)
to the prosecutor's peremptory strikes, which constituted gender discrimination in the
selection process in violation of the Equal Protection provision of the federal constitution.
See U. S. Const, amend. XIV; see also J.E.B.* 511 U.S. at 146 (stating the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
"prohibits discrimination injury selection on the basis of gender"); Shepherd, 1999 UT
App 305, f 28. The prosecutor's discriminatory actions violated Rosa-Re's constitutional
rights as well as the rights of the wrongfully stricken venire members. See Valdez, 2006
UT 39, ^|17 (recognizing, among other things, that the Batson process protects
prospective jurors from discrimination); Parham, 490 S.E.2d at 703.
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After the jurors were sworn, the trial court excused the remainder of the venire and
empaneled the jury; the court then turned to addressing the Batson challenge. (R.
146:39). The court stated, "Okay, the jury is out of the courtroom and prospective jurors
have left. Mr. Misner, if you [] want the benefit of the record at this point?" Defense
counsel again stated that the prosecutor engaged in gender discrimination in the jury
selection process when he removed the top three men, who presumptively would sit on
the jury panel. (R. 146:39).
The trial judge then asked the prosecutor to respond. (R. 146:40). The prosecutor
stated his actions were "unintentional" and he "did not keep a tally of male versus female." (R. 146:40); but see Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (stating a prosecutor's good faith is
not enough to overcome a claim of discrimination). The prosecutor also pointed out that
the defense struck the only minority member from the venire. (R. 146:40); but see J.E.B.,
511 U.S. at 129 (recognizing the state used all but one strikes on men, while defendant
used all but one strikes on women; the state's actions constituted discrimination).
The trial court and defense counsel then identified the three male venire members
at issue: Tidwell, Worley and Jensen. (R. 146:40). And the trial court asked the parties
to specify why they used peremptory strikes as they did. (R. 146:41).
After defense counsel explained his reasons for striking venire members (see R.
146:41; Brief of Appellee, October 27, 2006, at 20 (stating defense counsel's reasons
were "legitimate")), the prosecutor explained that he struck Worley because he "was
looking for somebody with some education, it wasn't there." (R. 146:41). Yet Worley
did not disclose his educational background and he was not asked about it. He disclosed
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that he read National Geographic and the newspaper. (R. 146:7).
Next, the prosecutor struck Jensen - an executive officer to a corporation, and a
person who had attended college, raised two children, and served previously on a jury (R.
146:7, 18) - because it was his "personal opinion" that Jensen would not give the case
"the necessary attention." (R. 146:41). And he struck Tidwell - an engineer, who had
graduated from college, raised four children, and served previously on a jury (R. 146:2-3,
17) - because it was his "gut instinct" that Tidwell "was not a person" who had "anything
he could really bring to the jury panel." (R. 146:41-42).
The prosecutor's reasons lacked specificity, legitimacy, and support in the record;
they were vague and unrelated to the case. See, e.g., Vqldez, 2006 UT 39, Tfl5 (stating the
prosecutor must proffer justifications that are "(1) neutral; (2) related to the particular
case to be tried; (3) reasonably specific and clear; and (4) legitimate"); State v. Cantu,
77'8 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989) (recognizing that when the prosecutor's reasons for
striking a venire member are unrelated to the case or are equally applicable to other
members - who were not stricken - the reasons may constitute "an impermissible
pretext" for discrimination) (citation omitted); U.S. v. Horslev. 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th
Cir. 1989) (stating the prosecutor's explanation that he struck a juror because "I just got a
feeling about him," "obviously [fell] short" of being clear and specific); People v.
BlackwelU 665 N.E.2d 782, 788 (111. 1996) (stating the "repeated use of vague, mistaken,
and inconsistent explanations suggests that the State's reasons are pretextual"); J.E.B.,
511 U.S. at 142 n.13 (stating the "exclusion of even one juror for impermissible reasons
harms that juror and undermines public confidence in the fairness of the system").
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After the prosecutor explained his reasons, the trial court asked defense counsel,
"Okay, are you satisfied?" (R. 146:42). At that point, defense counsel advised the court
to decide the issue: "Well, I think the record has been made, Your Honor, I think at this
point the Court simply needs to decide either to uphold the panel or strike the panel." (R.
146:42). Defense counsel's response was appropriate under the law. See Valdez, 2006
UT 39,1f 15 (when a party makes a Batson challenge, under the third step of the analysis
the trial court must decide if there was discrimination in the selection process). Counsel
also advised the court that once it ruled, they could proceed in accordance with the ruling:
"We're satisfied with whatever the Court's decision is." (R. 146:42). That response was
appropriate under the law. See Utah R. Crim. P. 20 (2007) (stating that once a party has
objected "[ejxceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary"; it is sufficient
that the party has stated the objection and the reasons therefor); see also Salt Lake City v.
Holtman, 806 P.2d 235, 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing that once a defendant
makes an objection, it is unnecessary to continue with the objection).
The trial court then ruled as follows:
Well, I have reviewed my notes that I took during the jury voir dire. I've looked at
the pattern and way in which the peremptories were exercised by both sides. I do
find that obviously it's a seven woman, one man jury, but based upon the reasons
given and the conduct of both sides, I don't find a violation of Batson and [the]
jury is constituted and the explanations given satisfy the Court that this jury may
proceed.
(R. 146:42-43).
In this case, defense counsel raised the Batson issue in a timely manner - before
the court empaneled the jury and excused the remainder of the venire - and specified that
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the Batson challenge was based on gender discrimination. (See R. 146:38; 164). That
objection was appropriate. See Valdez, 2006 UT 39,ffl[2,43; Holzate. 2000 UT 74, |11
(identifying the policy considerations served by the preservation rule). Defense counsel
did not seek to reserve an objection for later. In addition, counsel was not seeking to
sandbag the court or prosecution; he was not seeking to manipulate the trial at an
inopportune point at the conclusion of the case. Defense counsel raised the issue in time
for the court to perform its function effectively and to fashion an appropriate remedy.
(SeeR. 146:38; 164).
Notwithstanding the timely objection, the trial court failed to follow the Batson
three-part test until later. (See R. 146:39-42). Indeed, after defense counsel made the
Batson objection and specified that the challenge concerned gender discrimination (R.
164:38 (stating the prosecutor struck male jurors)), the trial court then announced the
jurors to be empaneled, had them sworn in, and excused the sworn jury and the jury pool
before resolving the matter under the Batson analysis. (R. 146:38-39).
When the trial court returned to the Batson issue, it denied the challenge in part
because the jury was already "constituted." (R. 146:42). The trial court's post hac
rationalization was improper. See Vgldez, 2006 UT 39, ^[44 (recognizing that if the
venire has already been dismissed, a sustained Batson challenge will require the trial
judge to call additional jurors, call an entirely new venire from which to select a new
jury, or declare a mistrial); see also Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 679 (stating that a trial court's
postponement of a Batson claim "may create a subtle pressure for even the most
conscientious district judge to accept explanations of borderline plausibility to avoid the
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only relief then available, a new trial").
The trial court was required to resolve the Batson challenge in a timely manner.
See Valdez, 2006 UT 39, Tfl[42, 43, 44 (recognizing that the Batson process "rests on the
premise that the trial court will hear the objection and make a factual finding"; stating "it
is necessary" that challenges are promptly raised and "that courts timely rule upon them";
and stating that the Batson test "encourages prompt rulings on objections"); Parhgm, 490
S.E.2d at 703; Biqggi, 909 F.2d at 679 (stating that a delay in resolving the Batson
challenge "risks infecting" the process, and "may create a subtle pressure" for the trial
court judge to accept "borderline" justifications for exercising peremptory strikes in order
to avoid "the only relief then available, a new trial"). In this case it failed to do so. (See
R. 146:38-39 (postponing resolution of the challenge until later)). That was error.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED THAT FOR A TIMELY OBJECTION.
DEFENDANT WAS REQUIRED TO RESOLVE A BATSON CHALLENGE
BEFORE THE JURY WAS EMPANELED. YET THAT RULING
DISREGARDS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TRIAL COURT.
When Rosa-Re raised the Batson issue in the court of appeals, the court rejected
the issue as untimely. See Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91. The court ruled that "Defendant's
trial counsel failed to conclude a Batson challenge prior to the empaneling of the jury."
Id. Also, it stated that "Defendant failed to resolve his objection to the makeup of the
jury 'before the jury [was] sworn and before the remainder of the venire ha[d] been
excused.'" I± (citing Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f47).
The court of appeals seemed to require defense counsel to do more than make a
Batson challenge as set forth in Valdez, 2006 UT 39, f43, for timely preservation. Indeed
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the court of appeals required defense counsel to "conclude" or "resolve" the objection.
Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91. That ruling is in error.
Under the analytical framework of the Batson process, the party raising the challenge must make a prima facie case for discrimination. That is what Rosa-Re did. (See
R. 146:38; 164 (making a Batson challenge due to prosecutor's use of preemptory strikes
to remove men from the venire)). His objection was timely. See_ Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^[2.
Thereafter, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to give gender-neutral reasons for
his actions and the court must resolve the matter. See, e.g., Valdez, 2006 UT 39,1fl5;
(also supra, pp. 6-8). The responsibility for resolving and concluding the Batson
challenge is with the trial court. The Batson process "rests on the premise that the trial
court will hear the objection " and make a determination in the matter. See Valdez, 2006
UT 39, Tf42 (citation omitted; emphasis added). Also, "it is necessary" that trial courts
"timely rule" on Batson challenges. Id_ at ^[43 (emphasis added); see also Parham, 490
S.E.2d at 703; Biaezi* 909 F.2d at 679.
According to the code of judicial conduct, it is the duty of the trial court to
respond to objections, resolve matters, move them along, and maintain order and decorum in proceedings. See. Utah Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3.B.(3) & (8) (2007). That
obligation does not fall on the shoulders of defense counsel. See icL_ at Canon 3.B.(8)
(requiring a judge to dispose of "all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly").
Defense counsel is not in a position to "conclude" or "resolve" (quoting Rosa-Re,
2007 UT App 91) a Batson issue that he has raised. Indeed, if defense counsel were
required to insist on a resolution or demand action from the trial court in the matter, that
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would put trial counsel in an uncomfortable, possibly even contemptuous, posture with
the court.
In this case, the trial court delayed in resolving and concluding the Batson
challenge. (SeeR. 146:38; 164). That was trial court error. Rosa-Re should not be
penalized on appeal for that error. Indeed Rosa-Re timely raised the Batson challenge for
preservation purposes. (See id.) He raised the challenge "before the jury [was] sworn
and before the remainder of the venire [was] excused." Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^[2.
Since Rosa-Re's objection was timely, the court of appeals should have addressed
the merits of the Batson issue. It erred in failing to do that. See Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App
91.
Finally, in holding defense counsel responsible for resolving Batson challenges in
a timely manner, the court of appeals relied on this Court's discussion of Redd v. Negley,
785 P.2d 1098 (Utah 1989). The court of appeals stated, "[T]he supreme court noted that
the situation in Redd v. Nezley, 785 P.2d 1098 (Utah 1989), [']whereby an objection was
made prior to the swearing of the jury but not addressed by the court until after the jury
was sworn in and dismissed, will generally not meet the [timeliness] standard we set forth
today.[']" Rosa-Re, 2007 UT App 91 (citing Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^[33 n.19).
Rosa-Re maintains the court of appeals misapprehended this Court's language in
Valdez concerning Redd. Indeed, the facts in Redd are distinguishable from this matter.
In Redd, 785 P.2d 1098, before a jury was sworn, plaintiffs counsel approached
the bench for a conference. See UL at 1099. The case does not reveal what happened
during the bench conference. However, shortly after the conference and in connection
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with swearing in the jury, the judge indicated that plaintiffs counsel had reserved "certain
qualifications that we want to put on the record." Id. Based on that summary, it appeared
that the plaintiff in Redd approached the bench to reserve an objection for later. See_ id,
(where the trial court invited Reddfs counsel later to put "something" on the record
"relative to the jury"). After the court later dismissed the jury for lunch, plaintiffs
counsel made an "unsupported and vague oral objection" to the composition of the jury.
Id. at 1099-1100. The trial court rejected the objection as untimely. M at 1100. This
Court disagreed with the trial court ruling.
This Court stated that plaintiffs actions in reserving the objection for later were
sufficient for preservation purposes. Id^ at 1100. It approved of the procedure where
plaintiff approached the bench to reserve an objection, then passed the jury for cause and
later articulated the objection. See id.
However, in Valdez, this Court appeared to retreat from the ruling in Redd. In a
footnote, it stated that the procedure in Redd, "whereby an objection was made prior to
the swearing of the jury but not addressed by the court until after the jury was sworn in
and dismissed, will generally not meet the standard we set forth today." Valdez, 2006 UT
39,p3n.l9.
A Batson challenge must be raised both before the jury is sworn and before the
venire is dismissed in order to allow the trial court to adequately remedy a Batson
violation if one has occurred. Obviously, if the grounds for the Batson challenge
are not articulated until after the jury has been sworn and the remainder of the
venire is dismissed, the trial court cannot cure a Batson violation.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
The footnote language in Valdez should not be construed to mean that the
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defendant is responsible for resolving the objection before the jury is swom. Rather, the
language should be read to place the responsibility of addressing/resolving an objection
on the trial court. The trial court's procedure of waiting to address the objection until
after the jury is sworn "will generally not meet the standard" in existence today. Id
Thus, if a trial court postpones ruling on a timely objection, that is error.
Here, defense counsel requested a bench conference, wherein he made a timely
Batson challenge. (R. 164). Counsel specifically referenced Batson and objected to the
prosecutor's actions as motivated by gender discrimination; he also requested trial court
action. (See R. 164). The trial court heard the objection and agreed to resolve the matter
(zdL), but failed to do so until later. (R. 146:39-43). Where the trial court failed to
properly resolve the Batson challenge that was timely raised in this case, that constituted
trial court error. The court of appeals' ruling should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner Dennis Rosa-Re respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the timeliness issue, and remand the
case to the court of appeals for a decision on the merits of the Batson issue.
SUBMITTED this 3rd

day of

Oc^o\)<?r

,2007.

Linda M. Jones
ff
Michael Misner
Heather Chesnut
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
Attorneys for Defendant/Petitioner
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For
Official Publication)
DAVIS, Judge:
*1 Defendant Dennis Rosa-Re appeals
his conviction for forcible sexual abuse,
a second degree felony. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-404(2003). We affirm.
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is
that the State improperly exercised its
peremptory challenges to remove males
from the jury in violation of the Equal
© 2007 Thomson/West. No
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Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution, see U.S. Const, amend.
XIV, § 1: Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S.
79, 89 (1986); see also J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994)
(holding that "the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits discrimination in jury
selection on the basis of gender"); State
v. Valdez. 2006 UT 39,1| If 13-19, 140
P.3d 1219 (discussing history of Batson
challenges). The State argues that
Defendant's Batson challenge was
untimely because it was not raised and
addressed by the trial court before the
jury was sworn and the venire dismissed.
We agree. The question of whether
Defendant's "Batson challenge was
timely raised is a question of law," which
we review for correctness. Valdez, 2006
U T 3 9 a t f 11.
In State v. Valdez, the Utah Supreme
Court concluded that "a Batson
challenge must be raised before the jury
is sworn and before the remainder of the
venire has been excused in order to be
timely under Utah law." Id. at TJ 47. In
reaching its holding, the supreme court
noted that the situation in Redd v.
Nezlev, 785 P.2d 1098 (Utah 1989),
whereby an objection was made prior to
the swearing of the jury but not
addressed by the court until after the jury
was sworn in and dismissed, will
generally not meet the standard we set
forth today. A Batson challenge must be
raised both before the jury is sworn and
before the venire is dismissed....
Obviously, if the grounds for the Batson
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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challenge are not articulated until after
the jury has been sworn and the
remainder of the venire is dismissed, the
trial court cannot cure a Batson violation.
Valdez, 2006 UT 39 at f 33 n. 19. Thus,
in order to be timely, the grounds for a
Batson challenge must be raised and
addressed by the trial court prior to the
swearing in of the jury and the dismissal
of the venire. See also Mooney v. State,
105 P .3d
149. 153 (Alaska
Ct.App.2005) (aligning Alaska courts
"with the courts that require defendants
to raise Batson challenges before the
remaining members of the jury venire are
released and the jury is sworn"); State v.
Parrisk 111 P.3d 671, 674 (Mont.2005)
("[C]ounsel must raise a Batson
challenge before the district court swears
the jury and dismisses the venire."); see
also Gaskin v. State, 873 So.2d 965, 968
fMiss.2004).
The rationale for such a bright line rule is
clear. "[A] Batson challenge must be
raised in such a manner that the trial
court is able to fashion a remedy in the
event a Batson violation has occurred."
Valdez. 2006 UT 39 at f 44. Otherwise,
"to allow a Batson challenge to proceed
after the venire has been dismissed is
only to sanction abuse." Id. Furthermore,
the rule requiring "that a Batson
challenge be raised [and ruled upon] both
before the jury is sworn and before the
venire is dismissed, efficiently allows the
trial court to determine the issues the
Batson test is designed to resolve." Id. at
If 43.
*2 Here, Defendants trial counsel failed
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to conclude a Batson challenge prior to
the empaneling of the jury. In a sidebar
conference, trial counsel stated "we're
probably going to need the record to
make a Batson challenge.... [BJecause of
the sixteen perspective [sic] jurors that
we had left after the for-causes, four
were men, three were stricken by the
[S]tate." After the brief sidebar
discussion, the trial court read the names
of the jurors, and both Defendant's trial
counsel and the prosecutor affirmed that
these jurors made up the jury that they
had selected. The trial court then swore
in the jury and released the remaining
members of the venire. Other than
raising the Batson issue in the side-bar
conference, Defendant's trial counsel
never objected to the makeup of the jury.
After the swearing in of the jury and
release of the venire, Defendant's trial
counsel then argued his Batson
challenge, which the trial court denied.
Defendant's Batson challenge falls
squarely within the holding and
reasoning of Valdez. Defendant failed to
resolve his objection to the makeup of
the jury "before the jury [was] sworn and
before the remainder of the venire ha[d]
been excused." Id. at \ 47. As such,
Defendant's Batson challenge was
untimely, and we need not reach the
merits of his claim. We therefore affirm
Defendant's conviction.
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH,
Presiding Judge and CAROLYN B.
McHUGH, Judge.
Utah App.,2007.
State v. Rosa-Re
Not Reported in P.3d, 2007 WL 772769
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State of Utah,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
Case No. 20070305-SC
20060432-CA

v.
Dennis Rosa-Re,
Defendant and Petitioner,

AMENDED ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
certiorari, filed on April 13, 2007.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issue:
Whether Petitioner's Batson challenge was timely.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.

for The Court:

Dated

5< 2-&0 f

W/l^^-—
Christine M. Durham,
Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 3, 2007, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or
placed in Interdepartmental mailing-to be delivered to:
HEATHER CHESNUT
MICHAEL MISNER
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 E 500 S STE 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
MARK L SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHRISTINE SOLTIS
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854

Dated this July 3, 2007.
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1

After the instructions have been read, the State and the

2

defense will once again have the opportunity to make closing

3

statements to you to tell you what they think the evidence

4

did show and why you should be persuaded or not be persuaded

5

based on certain elements of the evidence.

6

As you try the case as jurors, you should remain

7

alert and attentive and again not express an opinion until

8

all of the evidence is in, until you've been asked to do so

9

by retiring to the jury room not to discuss the case with

10

anyone and not talk to the attorneys or read or review

11

anything else about the case.

12

if you would please stand.

Okay, when I read your names,

13

MR. ?: Your Honor, (inaudible).

14

THE COURT: Sure.

15

(Whereupon a sidebar was held)

16

THE COURT:

Dorothy Faranakis, Janet Anderson,

17

Tamara Solis, Judy Dearden, Connie Iverson, Janae Brochear,

18

Terry Pierce-Rich, Carl [inaudible].

19
20
21
22

MR. JOHNSON:

Can we approach a moment, Judge?

(Whereupon a sidebar was held)
THE COURT:

Mr. Johnson, is this the jury which

you've selected?

23

MR, JOHNSON:

24

THE COURT:

25

Yes, Your Honor.
And Mr. Misner and Ms. Chestnut, is

this the jury that you selected?

1

MR. MISNER:

2

THE COURT:

3

Yes, Your Honor, thank you.
Okay, will you each raise your right

hand please?

4

(Whereupon the jurors were sworn.)

5

THE COURT:

6

please come with the bailiff.

7

and you can get settled and we'll start in about 15 minutes.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Thank you.

If the eight of you would

He will show you the jury room

And the remainder of you we want to thank you for
being here, for coming, your attendance and we will excuse
you at this time.
(Whereupon the jury and the jury pool left the courtroom)
THE COURT:

Okay, the jury is out of the courtroom

and prospective jurors have left.
Mr. Misner, if you have want the benefit of the

15

record at this point?

16

MR. MISNER:

17

We would just want to challenge the jury that's

Yes, Your Honor, thank you.

18

selected based on the Batson challenge, Your Honor.

19

for cause after looking at the top 16 jurors left which would

20

be the only eligible jurors to choose from, four of those 16

21

prospective jurors were men, three of them were stricken by

22

the State.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. MISNER:

25

After

Okay, and your point being?
Just that it appears that the State is

attempting to strike men from the jury under Batson that
39

1

gender is a protected class with rights to serve on the jury

2

and there has to be certainly an alternative valid and

3

verifiable reason given for each strike once the Batson

4

challenge has been made.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. JOHNSON:

Mr. Johnson?
Well, Judge, it was totally

7

unintentional on the State's part. I did not keep a tally of

8

male versus female and it should be interested to note that

9

the victim on this case is a male, so it doesn't seem that

10
11

that would quite comport with that.
I would also hasten to add that if the Batson

12

challenge is raised, there was only one other individual of

13

color that is Angela Avila who was struck by the defense, so.

14

THE COURT:

15

of females in this whole panel.

16

MR. MISNER:

17

THE COURT:

18
19
20

Well, there were an inordinate number

Absolutely.
Now you're talking of, I suppose about

Mr. Tidwell and Mr. Worley?
MR. MISNER:

Tidwell, Worley and Mr. Jensen were

the three.

21

THE COURT:

And who struck Mr. Brown?

22

MR. JOHNSON:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. JOHNSON:

25

MR. MISNER:

Who struck, I'm ,sorry.
Brown?
That was defense •
That was defense.

That was our first
40

1

strike, Judge.

2
3

THE COURT:

You struck a male on him.

How many

males did you strike then?

4

MR. MISNER:

They've got one -

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. MISNER:

7

MR. JOHNSON:

We struck three as well, Your Honor.

8

MR. MISNER:

Yeah, they struck three males as well.

9

MR. JOHNSON:

Mr. Misner?
Yeah, I'm counting.

I mean, we're prepared to state the

10

grounds for that if there's a Batson challenge being made

11

against that.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. MISNER:

Okay.

Why don't you each do that then?

Your Honor, we have the same reason

14

for striking all four of the people that we struck and that

15

was that all four were single with no children, and our jury

16

pool that we want on this case are married with children.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. JOHNSON:

And Mr. Johnson, can you address those?
Sure, I can articulate with Mr.

19

Worley.

I was looking for somebody with some education, it

20

wasn't there.

21

personal opinion, and I think the detective shares that with

22

me that he's got a lot bigger fish to fry and I don't think

23

he would give it the necessary attention that we needed to

24

today.

Mr. Jensen is a CEO from Harmons.

It was my

Mr. Tidwell was just an individual that from the very

25 I beginning, I mean, gut instinct was not a person that
41

1

impressed me with anything that he could really bring to the

2

jury panel.

And then the fourth that the State struck -

3

MR. MISNER:

4

MR. JOHNSON:

Yeah, so that was my rationale, Your

MR. MISNER:

Our rationale, Your Honor, just so I'm

5

Is not at issue.

Honor.

6
7

clear is that just on the three men, but all four of them

8

that we struck is for the exact same reason, including Ms.

9

Avila.

10

(Off the record discussion)

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. MISNER:

Okay, are you satisfied?
Well, I think the record has been

13

made, Your Honor, I think at this point the Court simply

14

needs to decide either to uphold the panel or strike the

15

panel.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. MISNER:

18

Court's decision is.

19

THE COURT:

Oh, I understand.
We're satisfied with whatever the

Well, I have reviewed my notes that I

20

took during the jury voir dire.

I've looked at the pattern

21

and way in which the preemptories were exercised by both

22

sides.. I do find that obviously it's a seven woman, one man

23

jury, but based upon the reasons given and the conduct of

24

both sides, I don't find a violation of Batson and jury is

25 I constituted and the explanations given satisfy the Court that
42

1

this jury may proceed.

2

MR. MISNER:

3

THE COURT:

4

Thank you, Your Honor.
The Court's in recess

(Whereupon a recess was taken)

5

THE COURT:

We are back on the record in State

6

versus Rosa-Re.

All parties are present and the jury has

7

returned and we thank you again for being here.

8

Mr. Johnson?

9

MR. JOHNSON:

10

Thank you, Your Honor.

May it please

the Court, counsel.

11

. Good morning.

When Joshua Bolanos went to bed at

12

10:00 on Monday, March 28th, he really didn't expect much

13

other than a great night's sleep.

14

the defendant, Dennis Rosa-Re, who was introduced to Joshua

15

as a co-worker of his fathers.

16

driver.

17

introduced to him and was told that Dennis was to spend the

18

night because his dad was a long-haul truck driver and then

19

the next morning, very early in the morning, both Dennis and

20

his father were going to get up and drive truck.

Earlier that night he met

His dad is a long-haul truck

That's the first time he met him, and he was

Joshua's going to [inaudible] sleep was interrupted

21
22

with a horrible, horrible nightmare.

He woke up to feel, as

23

he will describe on the stand, as a vice grip, a pain on his

24

penis.

25

underneath his shorts and actually physically grabbing his

Startled he woke up and saw the defendant reaching
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1

After the i n s t r u c t i o n s have been read, the State and the

2

defense will once again have the opportunity to make c l o s i n g

3

statements to you to tell you what they think the e v i d e n c e

4

did show and why you should be p e r s u a d e d or not be p e r s u a d e d

5

based on c e r t a i n elements of the evidence.

6

As you try the case as j u r o r s , you s h o u l d r e m a i n

7

alert and a t t e n t i v e and again not express an o p i n i o n until

8

all of the e v i d e n c e is in, until y o u ' v e been asked to do so

9

by r e t i r i n g to t h e j u r y room not to discuss the c a s e with

10

anyone and not talk to the attorneys or read or r e v i e w

11

anything else about the case. Okay, when I read y o u r n a m e s ,

12

if you w o u l d p l e a s e stand.

13

M R . M I S N E R : Your Honor, p e r m i s s i o n to a p p r o a c h

14

the b e n c h ?

15 I

THE COURT: Sure.
M R . M I S N E R : I think given the s e r i o u s n e s s of the
charges w e ' r e p r o b a b l y going to need the r e c o r d to make a
Batson c h a l l e n g e . Just wanted to make e v e r y b o d y a w a r e
because of t h e sixteen perspective j u r o r s that we had left after
the f o r - c a u s e s , four were men, three were, s t r i c k e n by the s t a t e .
MR. J O H N S O N : Come again?
MR. M I S N E R :

We had four p o t e n t i a l male j u r o r s and

you struck t h r e e .
MR. J O H N S O N : Oh,well,
M R . M I S N E R : So we just need the r e c o r d .
T H E C O U R T : So, you also s t r u c k a H i s p a n i c t o o .
M R . M I S N E R : Yeah.

MR. JOHNSON: Okay, well that w a s n ' t intentional on my
part.
MR. MISNER: Well, we j u s t need to make a record and go
through the...
THE COURT: Okay, alright, we can do t h a t .
MR.MISNER:Okay.
16
17
18

I

THE COURT: Dorothy F a r a n a k i s , Janet A n d e r s o n ,
T a m a r a Solis, Judy D e a r d e n , Connie Iverson, Janae Brochear,

I T e r r y P i e r c e - R i c h , Carl ( i n a u d i b l e ) .
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AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Set. Ju (.Representatives
ment.]

Power to reduce

appoint-

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation the
provisions of this article.

